

June 2025

AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF CLARENDON COUNTY'S BALLOT RECONCILIATION WORKSHEETS FROM THE NOVEMBER 2022 GENERAL ELECTION



The mission of the South Carolina State Election Commission (SEC) is to ensure every eligible citizen can register to vote and participate in fair and impartial elections, knowing that every vote counts and every vote matters.

Pursuant to S.C. Code §7-3-20(D)(3), the SEC is authorized to conduct audits of county boards of voter registration and elections to ensure those boards' compliance with applicable state or federal laws or SEC policies, procedures, or standardized processes regarding the conduct of elections or the voter registration process by all persons involved. These audits are conducted by the SEC's Audit Division.

Additionally, S.C. Code §7-3-25(A) authorizes the SEC to identify any compliance failures and establish and implement a corrective action to remedy such failures. Recommendations in this report will require implementation of a corrective action plan that is developed by the county and approved by the SEC's Audit Division.

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Table of Contents

Summary of Results	1
Background	1
State Law and SEC Requirements	3
Overview of the Ballot Reconciliation Worksheet	3
Sample and Results	7
Recommendations	14
Figures	
Figure 1: S.C. State Election Commission's Election Day Ballot Reconciliation Worksheet	
Figure 2: Worksheet Diagram for the Definition of Completed and Reconciled	
Figure 3: Overall Completion and Reconciliation Status of the Worksheets	
Figure 4: Reconciliation Status of Line 1	
Figure 5: Reconciliation Status of Line 2	12
Appendices	
Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology	
Appendix B: Clarendon County Comments	16

Summary of Results

For the November 2022 General Election, 39% of Clarendon County's ballot reconciliation worksheets were completed, and 44% were reconciled. For the 61% of the worksheets that were partially completed, this was, in part, likely due to the lack of a requirement from the State Election Commission (SEC) to fill every field, even if zero. Ensuring the county's worksheet review process includes a review of the entire worksheet for completion, supplies its precincts with the required number of hand-marked paper ballots, and validates the worksheet's entries with returned election data can correct noted imbalances. Adequately completing and reconciling the ballot reconciliation worksheet will give greater assurance that all valid ballots cast have been included in the election results.

Background

As defined by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, ballot reconciliation is the method in which election officials keep track of each ballot that has been printed or issued to a voter. Tracking the number of ballots printed, used, and unused during an election cycle ensures election officials have accounted for every ballot created and the election results include every valid ballot cast.

In South Carolina, printed paper ballots were not common until the state's current voting equipment was implemented in all 46 counties in 2020. Prior to then, the state used a direct recording electronic, or DRE, as part of its voting system. A DRE is a vote capture device, in which ballots are displayed, selections are made, and results are stored all via electronic format. The exceptions to this were the ballots printed for voters whose right to vote had been challenged at the precinct or who had moved but were still allowed to vote and the printed ballots used in emergency situations. Since these ballots were the only ballots in paper form, these were the only ballots that could be accounted for at the time.

South Carolina's transition in February 2020 to a paper-based voting system, with 100% printed paper ballots, significantly altered the process of accounting for ballots. In preparation for the change to this new system, the SEC developed a ballot reconciliation worksheet in September 2019 to account for and reconcile ballots supplied, used, not used, and lost as well as the number of voters who voted. Over the last five years, there have been minor updates to the worksheet, but it remains generally the same as the September 2019 version. Figure 1 below is an image of the ballot reconciliation worksheet used during the 2022 November General Election. It is important to note that a description of the worksheet and the terms used within are included in the analysis that follows.

Figure 1: S.C. State Election Commission's Election Day Ballot Reconciliation Worksheet _Precinct ______ Date _____ County _ **Ballots Supplied** A Ballot Cards (Completed by County Office) Hand-Marked Paper Ballots (Completed by County Office) (Emergency/Provisional + Failsafe Provisional) Additional Ballot Cards Additional Hand-Marked Paper Ballots (Emergency/Provisional + Failsafe Provisional) Total 1 **Ballots Used** Ballots Scanned (Ballot Cards and Emergency Ballots) (Number displayed on the Scanner/DS200) F | Provisional Ballots (Hand-Marked Paper Ballots/Envelopes) G | Spoiled Ballots (Ballot Cards + Hand-Marked Paper Ballots Total 2 **Ballots Not Used Ballot Cards** Hand-Marked Paper Ballots (Emergency/Provisional + Failsafe Provisional) Total 3 Voters Checked In Electronic Poll Book (EPB) Paper Poll List (Include Provisionals NOT entered in the EPB) (DO NOT Include Curbside Poll List) Total 4 Total 2 + Total 3 (Should equal Total 1) Total 4 +G(Should equal Total 2) Explain any discrepancies: Are you returning any Emergency ballots that have not been scanned? Yes 🗌 No 🗍 (Do NOT include Provisional or Failsafe Provisional ballots) SEC FRM 1150-202208 every vote matters every vote counts.

Source: S.C. State Election Commission

State Law and SEC Requirements

While state law only requires ballot reconciliation for election day, the SEC's standardized operating procedures mandate this process for absentee and early voting as well. However, the scope of our audit was limited to election day ballot reconciliation, specifically for the 2022 November General Election. Therefore, the following sections provide an overview of the legal requirements for ballot reconciliation and the SEC's ballot reconciliation worksheet as they pertain to election day.

Overview

S.C. Code §7-13-1150 requires poll clerks—the lead poll managers—to account for all ballots delivered to them and return the number of ballots supplied, spoiled—ballots that were defaced or marked in error—unused, voted, and lost, if any. S.C. Code §7-13-1410 requires poll managers to count the number of individuals who voted as well as unused and spoiled ballots. Between the two sections of the law, a poll clerk must account for ballots supplied, ballots used—including spoiled and lost ballots—ballots unused, and voters who voted. This accounting of ballots is also referred to as ballot reconciliation.

By Voting Type and Election Type

In the abovementioned sections of state law, the use of the terms poll clerk and precinct suggest that ballot reconciliation is performed by a clerk at a precinct, which only occurs on election day. As for election type, Title 7 of the S.C. Code of Laws applies to all types of elections—primary, general, special, and runoff. As such, ballot reconciliation is required to be performed for all types of elections. Because these worksheets are intended to ensure all valid ballots in an election have been cast, they are to be completed prior to a county's certification—a statement by the county's board of canvassers that election results are a true and accurate accounting of all votes cast in a particular election.

Overview of the Ballot Reconciliation Worksheet

The SEC's ballot reconciliation worksheet is intended to be used by poll clerks to document, by precinct, the total ballots supplied, used, unused, and voters who voted. This worksheet accounts for these required components and contains two formulas, which are meant to ensure the appropriate values reconcile with each other. The following describes each section of the worksheet and the terms used.

Ballot Reconciliation Worksheet Top Portion

The top three-fourths of the worksheet contains 11 rows labeled A–K to record ballots supplied, used, and not used and voters checked in. Note, the worksheet accounts for voters who voted in the section "Voters Checked In," as only voters who voted are checked in at a polling location. Specifically, rows A–K include the following:

Row	ACCOUNTS FOR	INCLUDES
A		Ballot Cards
В	Ballots Supplied	Hand-Marked Paper Ballots
С		Additional Ballot Cards
D		Additional Hand-Marked Paper Ballots
Е		Ballots Scanned
F	Ballots Used	Provisional Ballots
G		Spoiled Ballots
Н	Ballots Not Used	Ballot Cards
I		Hand-Marked Paper Ballots
J	Voters Checked In	Electronic Pollbook
K		Paper Poll List

Rows A–B are completed by county office staff, and rows C–K are completed by the poll clerk after the polls close. The terms used in the worksheet and referenced in the table above are defined below.

BALLOT CARD

The paper cardstock provided to a voter for the purpose of recording his vote selections using a ballot-marking device (definition below).

BALLOT-MARKING DEVICE

A piece of voting equipment that allows a voter to electronically select valid contest options and then produces a human-readable paper ballot. Ballots are not cast on this device.

HAND-MARKED PAPER BALLOT

A paper ballot marked by hand by a voter using a blue or black pen. A hand-marked paper ballot is used at the polling location for emergency voting, via an emergency ballot, and provisional voting, via a provisional or failsafe provisional ballot (definitions below).

EMERGENCY BALLOT

A hand-marked paper ballot used in the event the ballot-marking device is inoperable or otherwise unavailable. Generally, these ballots are cast at the polling location.

PROVISIONAL BALLOT

A hand-marked paper ballot used when a voter's eligibility to vote is challenged, which may occur, for instance, if he has already received a ballot in the mail but insists on voting at a polling location.

FAILSAFE PROVISIONAL BALLOT

A hand-marked paper ballot used when a voter has moved from one precinct to another within the same county and failed to update his address or has moved from one South Carolina county to another within 30 days of the election.

Provisional and failsafe provisional ballots are not counted on election day. Instead, they are stored in individual sealed envelopes and kept separate from ballots that have been cast; these are the envelopes referred to in row F on the worksheet. After the polls close but prior to certification, the voter's eligibility is reviewed, and a determination is made to either accept or reject these ballots based on this review by the county board of canvassers. Accepted ballots are then counted.

SCANNER/DS200

A piece of voting equipment used to read the voter selections from a ballot card or a hand-marked paper ballot. Ballots are cast on this device.

SPOILED BALLOT

A ballot that has been defaced or marked in error. For example, a voter may make a selection by mistake and then return the ballot to a poll clerk for a second ballot. The term "spoiled" is then written on the back of the ballot and retained for records. State law also refers to a spoiled ballot as a soiled, marred, and defaced ballot.

ELECTRONIC POLLBOOK

A piece of election equipment in the form of a tablet that contains the electronic version of the voter registration list, which is used to determine whether a person is eligible to vote in an election and in the precinct. These pollbooks also have the ability to capture a voter's signature, which is evidence that a voter took the voter's oath. Ballots are not cast on this device.

PAPER POLL LIST

A form containing the voter's oath and signatures of voters who have taken the voter's oath. Paper poll lists are used when the electronic pollbooks are not available or when voters must be checked in manually.

Ballot Reconciliation Worksheet Bottom Portion

The bottom one-fourth of the worksheet contains the reconciliation portion, which is also to be completed by the poll clerk. Line 1, as follows, is intended to reconcile the number of used and unused ballots with the total ballots supplied.

Line 2 below is intended to reconcile the number of voters checked in with the number of ballots used.

Beneath the reconciliation formulas, there is a space to address any issues, including ballots that were lost or unscanned.

Worksheet Color Coding

For ease of completion, ballot reconciliation worksheets are meant to be printed in color. Four different colors are used for Totals 2 through 4 as well as for spoiled ballots:

Color	Corresponds to	
None	Total 1	Ballots Supplied
Yellow	Total 2	Ballots Used
Blue	Total 3	Ballot Not Used
Orange	Total 4	Voters Checked In
Green	Row G	Spoiled Ballots

Each color at the top of the worksheet has a corresponding color at the bottom, where reconciliation is performed. These colors are meant to assist the user in transferring the data from the top to the correct field at the bottom. It is important to note the color yellow for Total 2 and the color orange for Total 4 can often appear similar in appearance when printed.

Sample and Results


We reviewed a sample of ballot reconciliation worksheets from the November 2022 General Election for Clarendon County to determine if they were adequately completed and reconciled. For this election, the county completed its ballot reconciliation worksheets by precinct, and all sampled worksheets were available for review. Per S.C. Code §7-13-1150, ballot reconciliation worksheets are to be completed by precinct. However, since counties, at times, consolidate multiple precincts into a single polling location, we conducted our analysis by polling location.

For this election, the county had 20 polling locations. The sample included 18 of the 20 polling locations, and the results were calculated at a 99% confidence level ± 10 percentage points. Therefore, these results can be generalized about all Clarendon County polling locations during the 2022 General Election.

For this review, the term "completed" meant rows C–K contained values. If a field in rows C–K was blank, zero was assumed unless zeros were used elsewhere on the worksheet. The total boxes for each section (Total 1, Total 2, Total 3, and Total 4) were not included within the definition of completed, as they were a separate method of counting ballots and voters to what was presented in rows C–K. Additionally, the term "reconciled" meant the addition in Line 1 and the resulting value in N equaled the value in Total 1 (Total Ballots Supplied), and the addition in Line 2 and the resulting value in Q equaled the value in Total 2 (Total Ballots Used).

Figure 2 below provides a diagram of what was considered completed and reconciled on the worksheet. Note, information in red was added to the diagram to distinguish otherwise unidentified fields and sections of the worksheet.


Figure 2: Worksheet Diagram for the Definition of Completed and Reconciled



Source: S.C. State Election Commission

For Clarendon County, 39% (7/18) of the worksheets were completed, and 44% (8/18) of the worksheets reconciled. Figure 3 below illustrates the overall completion and reconciliation status of these worksheets.

Figure 3: Overall Completion and Reconciliation Status of the Worksheets



Note: The outer ring percentage is off by 1% due to rounding.

Source: Analysis of Clarendon County's Ballot Reconciliation Worksheets, 2022 General Election

Completion of the Worksheets

For Clarendon County, 39% (7/18) of the worksheets were completed and 61% (11/18) were partially completed. For the 11 worksheets that were partially completed, 64% (7/11) had 1 or more rows left blank, but other rows on the same worksheet contained zeros. If zeros had been filled in on these worksheets, then 78% (14/18) of all the worksheets would have been completed. The SEC's instructions for the worksheet do not require a user to fill all rows. However, as a third-party reviewer, it was difficult to discern if an empty row was an oversight or intentional. Requiring a value for all rows on the worksheet will likely improve clarity to all users. In December 2024, a recommendation was made to the SEC to require a value, even if zero, be written in each of the worksheet's fields.

For the other four partially completed worksheets:


- One was missing a single non-zero value.
- Two were missing a total of five non-zero values each.
- One had three values that were marked out and not replaced.

According to a county election official, in 2022 the county had a worksheet review process, which occurred the day after the election. Primarily, it reviewed the worksheets for any issues noted at the bottom. The information discussed in the bullets above was missing at the top of the worksheet in rows A–K and not the bottom on lines 1 and 2, which may be why it was missed. Improving its review process to ensure a review of the entire worksheet for completion can correct this issue.

Reconciliation of Line 1

Regarding reconciliation of Line 1, 56% (10/18) of the worksheets reconciled, while 22% (4/18) did not, and 22% (4/18) were not completed. Of those that did not reconcile, 2 of the worksheets were off by 7 or fewer ballots, and 2 of the worksheets were off by 60 and 81 ballots each. Figure 4 below provides a breakdown of the reconciliation status for Line 1.

Figure 4: Reconciliation Status of Line 1



Note: Percentage is off by 2% due to rounding.

Source: Analysis of Clarendon County's Ballot Reconciliation Worksheets, 2022 General Election

For the worksheet off by one ballot, the issue appears to be a result of not counting individual ballot cards. It is important to note, the ballot card packaging process weighs rather than counts ballot cards and could, therefore, cause packages to be off by $\pm 2\%$; a package of 250 could be over or under by as many as 5 ballot cards. If county staff and poll clerks count the ballot packages and not the individual ballot cards, the values in rows A–D could be incorrect and, therefore, cause Total 1 (Ballots Supplied) to be incorrect. According to a county election official, county office staff count ballot cards, which are then stacked, and board members, in turn,

count the ballot card stacks. Additionally, clerks have been trained to verify the number of ballots supplied. With only one worksheet off by one ballot, this is a minor issue. Having county election officials continue to count ballot cards and training poll clerks to verify those counts can eliminate this issue.

For the worksheet off by seven ballots, the issue is unclear due to unreliable data. Specifically, zero was written for hand-marked paper ballots supplied (row B), and there was a blank field for additional hand-marked paper ballots supplied (row D). However, a six was written for used provisional ballots, which are a type of hand-marked paper ballot. Since it is not possible to use a ballot that has not been provided, the values written on the worksheet for hand-marked paper ballots are not reliable. Without reliable totals for these ballots, it is not possible to determine the issue on this worksheet.

It should be noted that counties, by law, must provide a fixed percentage of hand-marked paper ballots to each voting place. Specifically, S.C. Code §7-13-430(A) requires emergency ballots for up to 10% of registered, qualified voters, and S.C. Code §7-13-430(C) requires failsafe ballots for up to 5% of registered, qualified voters. Both emergency and failsafe ballots are hand-marked paper ballots. Due to director turnover since 2022, the county's process for supplying these ballots during the November 2022 General Election is unclear. Ensuring county office staff supply hand-marked paper ballots and write down said amount on each precinct's ballot reconciliation worksheet during preparation for an election will correct any uncertainties about how many were supplied. Furthermore, this will provide the information needed to discern what, if any, issue occurred with reconciling the ballots supplied with the ballots used.

For the worksheet that was off by 60 ballots, the unused hand-marked paper ballots were not accounted for. Specifically, 60 were supplied (row B), but zero was written for both used (row F) and (row I) unused provisional ballots—a type of hand-marked paper ballot. If the poll clerk had written 60 for the unused hand-marked paper ballots, the line would have reconciled. Per a county election official, in 2022 the county office trained poll clerks with a ballot reconciliation worksheet hands-on exercise, providing clerks with number scenarios to complete the worksheet. In 2024, the county amplified this training, in which clerks were provided dummy ballots—spoiled and unused—and required to count them to obtain the totals, as they would on election night. Continuing to provide this amplified training will likely correct this issue.

For the worksheet that was off by 81 ballots, there appears to be two issues. First, the number of supplied hand-marked paper ballots (row B) was written as 20 but then marked out. It is also not clear if 20 was included in Total 1, as the total written looks like 350 but could also be 370. Second, the number of unused hand-marked paper ballots was off by 101 ballot cards. Since ballot cards can be packaged in packs of 100, it appears a pack of 100 ballot cards was not counted. Also, the 1 ballot in the total 101 suggests a

ballot packaging flaw and individual ballots cards were not counted, as discussed above.


It should be noted that three of the worksheets reconciled according to our definition but were false positives. For one worksheet, the result in Line 1 at the bottom of the worksheet equaled 337, which was also the same value of Total 1 at the top of the worksheet. However, in rows A–D at the top of the worksheet, there was only one value written, which was 350 for ballot cards supplied (row A); all other rows (B, C, and D) were blank. This would suggest that the value for Total 1 at the top of the worksheet (rows A+B+C+D) was 350. Yet, the user wrote 337. It appears 337 was written for Total 1 to equal the result for Line 1.

For the other two worksheets, the stated amount of hand-marked paper ballots supplied was either zero or left blank. However, the poll clerk noted the number of hand-marked paper ballots used (row F). As stated above, it is not possible to use more ballots than were supplied.

Reconciliation of Line 2

For reconciliation of Line 2, 56% (10/18) of the worksheets reconciled, while 17% (3/18) did not, and 28% (5/18) were not completed. For the worksheets that did not reconcile, two were off by two ballots or fewer, and one was off by ten ballots. Figure 5 below illustrates the reconciliation status for Line 2.

Figure 5: Reconciliation Status of Line 2



Note: Percentage off by 1% due to rounding.

Source: Analysis of Clarendon County's Ballot Reconciliation Worksheets, 2022 General Election

For the worksheet that was off by one ballot, there was one more voter checked in than ballots voted, including ballots scanned and provisional ballots used. Using turnout data—data logged by the EPB host server that shows the count of voters who were issued voting credit—the total voters checked in was overstated by one by the clerk on the worksheet. Using the turnout data, Line 2 reconciled. It is important to note that EPBs can have connectivity issues at polling locations, which can, at times, cause devices to display incorrect totals for voters checked at the polling location. However, the accurate log of checked-in voters is recorded in the turnout data. It is uncertain that the impact of these connectivity issues was known at the time of this election. While a county election official stated that they reviewed the worksheets for notes at the bottom, incorporating a worksheet review process, prior to certification, that verifies the voters checked in from the host server turnout report can ensure the number of these voters checked in is correct.

For the worksheet that was off by two ballots, there were also more voters checked in than ballots voted. Using DS200/scanner data, provisional ballot reports, and turnout data, we found that the clerk had understated the number of ballots scanned by one and overstated the number of voters checked in by two. This resulted in one more ballot voted than voters checked in. It may be that a voter was checked in on the paper poll list and either did not sign the list or the paper poll list signature was not counted on the worksheet (row K). Again, a worksheet review process that checks returned election data, such as paper poll lists, can correct this issue.

For the worksheet that was off by ten ballots, there were several data entry errors that contributed to the line not reconciling. As with before, we used DS200/scanner data, provisional ballot reports, and turnout data and found that the clerk had overstated the number of ballots scanned by ten, the number of provisional ballots used by two, and the number of voters checked in by one. After correcting with updated data, there was ultimately one more voter checked in than ballots voted. While not certain, it is likely that a voter checked in but did not cast his ballot. When a checked in voter receives a ballot but does not cast it, there are three scenarios that may occur: a voter may return the ballot to a poll manager, abandon the ballot during the voting process, or leave the precinct with the ballot. Per the 2022 General Election poll manager handbook, when a voter:

- Returns his ballot, the poll manager needs to spoil the ballot and cancel the voter's participation in the EPB; this would not cause a reconciliation imbalance.
- Abandons his ballot during the voting process and does not inform the poll managers, they must assume the voter intended to cast the ballot. Two poll managers must place the ballot in the scanner. This would not cause a reconciliation imbalance.
- Leaves with his ballot, the poll manager who is the exit monitor the poll manager who instructs voters on how to scan their ballots and provides "I Voted" stickers—needs to alert the voter. However,

it can be difficult to always know if a checked in voter has left with his ballot; this would cause a reconciliation imbalance. Under this circumstance, noting such a situation in the notes section on the worksheet is the only option to the poll clerk.

As for the data entry issues, incorporating a worksheet review process, prior to certification, that checks returned election materials and turnout report data can resolve the data entry imbalances.

As was the case with Line 1, there were two worksheets in which the amounts for the Ballots Supplied section was not reliable, resulting in false positives for reconciliation. After checking these worksheets against the DS200/scanner data, provisional ballot reports, and turnout data, there were also data entry errors found and likely voters who checked in but did not cast their ballots. Again, incorporating a worksheet review process, prior to certification, that checks returned election materials and data from the turnout report can resolve these imbalances.

Recommendations

- 1. The Clarendon County Voter Registration and Elections Office should ensure it supplies each of its precincts with the required number of hand-marked paper ballots at the opening of the election and write down the amount supplied on each precinct's ballot reconciliation worksheet.
- 2. The Clarendon County Voter Registration and Elections Office should implement a worksheet review process that checks and corrects, where necessary and prior to certification, the worksheets:
 - For completion.
 - Against returned election materials, such as provisional ballot envelopes and paper poll lists.
 - Against the host server turnout report data for voters checked in.

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

This report provides the results of our compliance audit of the Clarendon County Voter Registration and Elections Office and its use of the ballot reconciliation worksheet. We conducted this audit under the provision of S.C. Code §7-3-20(D)(3). The review period for the audit was for the November 2022 General Election, and the objective was to determine whether precinct ballot reconciliation worksheets from this election were adequately completed and reconciled. To conduct this audit, we used a variety of sources of evidence, including:

- Federal and state laws.
- S.C. State Election Commission (SEC) policies and procedures.
- SEC training materials.
- Interviews with and surveys of county election officials.
- Information from South Carolina and other state agencies as well as the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
- Contracts and information from Election Systems & Software and its vendor Printelect.
- Ballot reconciliation worksheets.

Criteria used to evaluate compliance was based on federal and state laws and agency policies, procedures, and training material. We reviewed internal controls in several areas, including SEC policies and procedures; county policies, procedures, and practices; and agency training. Our findings are detailed in this report.

Appendix B: Clarendon County Comments

No comments.